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Japan: From Passive Partner 
to Active Ally
HDP Envall
Japan is America’s key ally in the Asia-Pacific, with the US–Japan alliance 
the foundation of America’s role as a ‘Pacific’ power. Indeed, the United 
States ‘has no better friend in the world than Japan’.1 This important 
alliance emerged from Japan’s defeat in World War II and the subsequent 
American-led occupation, but especially from America’s shifting global 
strategy in the early Cold War. Increasingly tense relations with the Soviet 
Union, the communist victory in China and the Korean War pushed 
the United States to secure Japan within the Western bloc. The resulting 
strategic bargain between the two countries was for the United States to 
provide security for Japan, with Japan offering bases for the US military 
in return. The arrangement established Japan for the United States as 
a dependent security partner; however, it also allowed Japan to focus on 
the important postwar task of economic redevelopment.2
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Despite facing some significant challenges, as well as considerable change 
in both countries, this structure has persisted largely intact over the 
subsequent 65 years. This continuity has, however, begun to give way over 
the past decade, especially in terms of how Japan envisages the alliance. 
During this period, and particularly since 2010, the emergence of a more 
contested order in the Asia-Pacific has prompted Japan to move away 
from its traditional acceptance of key asymmetries in the alliance. Japan 
is now seeking to distance itself from its role as a passive alliance partner 
and become a more active US ally. 
This shift has been driven by the country’s changing threat perceptions 
and  the resulting recalculation of alliance risks. Japan—as with many 
junior  allies—has always struggled to manage the dilemma between 
entrapment and abandonment, the ‘secondary alliance’ dilemma 
described by Glenn Snyder.3 On the one hand, to rely excessively on the 
United States would be to risk becoming entrapped in American security 
engagements. On the other hand, however, to seek greater autonomy 
would be to risk being abandoned by the United States.4 Over the past 
decade, Japan has come to perceive the risks of entrapment, even as they 
remain substantial and could potentially rise further, as less problematic 
than the risks presented by the changing balance of power (and threat) in 
the region and thus of abandonment.5 In turn, this has pushed Japanese 
policymakers into revising the country’s approach to international security 
and its role within the US alliance.
In order to explain Japan’s experience of changing strategic conditions 
and security perceptions, this chapter assesses two interrelated dimensions 
of Japan’s strategic calculations. It seeks primarily to understand how, in 
terms of domestic politics, Japan has approached its role in the alliance. 
But it also examines how Japan has managed its engagement of the wider 
regional context, especially in terms of the biggest change to the region—
the rise of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China).6 This chapter 
3  See Glenn H Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, 
1984, pp. 466–68.
4  Green, ‘Balance of Power’, 2002, p. 14.
5  On increasing risks of abandonment and entrapment, see Nick Bisley, ‘Securing the “Anchor 
of Regional Stability”? The Transformation of the US‒Japan Alliance and East Asian Security’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 1, 2008, pp. 86–87. doi.org/10.1355/CS30-1D.
6  On the role of perceptions of power transition on dispute escalation between Japan and 
China, see Ryoko Nakano, ‘The Sino–Japanese Territorial Dispute and Threat Perception in Power 
Transition’, Pacific Review, vol. 29, no. 2, 2016, pp. 165–86. doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013
493.
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examines the evolution of these two dimensions across three periods—the 
Cold War, the post–Cold War until 2010, and the newly contested order 
since 2010 characterised by the rise of a more assertive China.
The Cold War, 1951–89
Defeat in World War II, the experience of postwar occupation, and the 
new threats of the Cold War fundamentally reshaped Japan’s security 
politics. The security role that Japan played in the emerging Cold War 
environment was influenced predominantly by the United States, its new 
ally. Accordingly, Japan adopted a pragmatic approach to its alliance with 
the United States and to its security policy more generally. As part of the 
grand bargain with the United States, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru 
Yoshida established a security strategy that trod a line in domestic politics 
between what conservatives (rearmament) and progressives (unarmed 
neutrality) expected. Relying on the United States for security protection 
in return for bases meant that Yoshida could deliver something to both 
camps—security for the conservatives and a restriction on Japan’s military 
capacity for the progressives. Yoshida’s deft politics eventually developed 
into the orthodox consensus of Japan’s Cold War security policy that came 
to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine.7
This doctrine provided Japan with a number of advantages throughout 
the Cold War. It allowed the country to focus on economic development 
after the devastation wrought by World War II rather than expend scarce 
resources on a quick military build-up. In what was a turbulent period 
of politics following the war, it also pushed the potentially divisive issue 
of defence to the periphery of Japanese politics. The capacity of alliance 
politics to destabilise Japanese politics would be briefly demonstrated by 
the US‒Japan security treaty revision crisis of 1960. After this episode, 
however, Yoshida’s successors in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) were able to keep the politics of the US‒Japan alliance largely 
out of Japanese politics. Most significantly for Japan’s alliance policy, 
the Yoshida Doctrine made use of Article 9 of the Constitution, which 
prohibited Japan from maintaining a military for the purpose of making 
7  Richard J Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2007, pp. 29–37. On Yoshida’s approach to postwar security politics, 
see also HDP Envall, ‘Exceptions that Make the Rule? Koizumi Jun’ichirō and Political Leadership 
in Japan’, Japanese Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 232–33. doi.org/10.1080/10371390802249198.
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or threatening war. This was done as a way of resisting US pressure on 
Japan to contribute more as an ally. Entrapment in US security actions 
thus became less of a risk for Japan during the Cold War.8 
Yet the Yoshida Doctrine also had its disadvantages. The first was that 
it institutionalised a Japanese dependence on the United States for the 
provision of security and overall strategic direction. This, in turn, meant 
a lack of autonomy for Japan in devising an international role for itself. 
The problem was recognised by Yoshida himself, who noted that the 
country would remain in a ‘state of weakness’ so long as it depended too 
heavily on the United States for its security.9 It was also the target of key 
postwar prime ministers, such as Nobusuke Kishi and Yasuhiro Nakasone. 
They saw Japan’s abrogation of its security role to the United States as 
a ‘humiliation’ and argued for Japan to adopt a more autonomous defence 
posture, even as they came around to supporting the US alliance at the 
core of Japan’s national security policies.10 Yoshida’s approach also made 
Japan vulnerable to US accusations of ‘free riding’; that is, benefiting from 
the security that America’s engagement provided without contributing to 
the upkeep of this engagement. Criticism of this failing was especially 
pronounced from the 1970s. It forced Japan to respond by taking up 
a greater share of the cost of US bases in Japan and by redefining the idea 
of ‘security’ to include more of the non-traditional security activities that 
Japan was undertaking. Thus, the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ was 
adopted and entered into Japanese security practice.11 
The asymmetry in the US‒Japan alliance also shaped Japan’s engagement 
with China during the first half of the Cold War. America’s diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan (Republic of China) and not the mainland 
constrained Japan’s dealings with China by forcing it to follow suit. 
In order to circumscribe the constraints where possible, however, Japan 
made use of its seikei bunri policy (separating economics and politics), 
through which it opened indirect trade relations with China. As a result, 
8  Kenneth B Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 2nd edn, Washington, 
DC: AEI Press, 1996, pp. 28–30.
9  Cited in Samuels, Securing Japan, 2007, p. 7.
10  Bhubhindar Singh, Japan’s Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State, London: 
Routledge, 2013, p. 56.
11  Kenneth B Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, New York: Public 
Affairs, 2007, p. 258. On comprehensive security, see Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon no ‘Midoru Pawaa’ 
Gaiko: Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Koso (Japan’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s Choices 
and Conceptions), Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005, pp. 153–54.
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trade was re-established between the two countries relatively soon after 
World War II, and indeed was only interrupted subsequently on rare 
occasions, such as during the outbreak of the Korean War.12 
When the United States began normalising its diplomatic relations with 
China in the 1970s, this also allowed Japan to engage China in a more 
cooperative manner, thereby opening up further trade opportunities for 
the two countries. From 1978, when it established an economic aid policy 
for China, Japan actively sought to promote economic development in 
China based on the reasoning that this was the best way to ensure that 
China would become a cooperative partner rather than a strategic rival. 
As Mike Mochizuki points out, ‘Japan was using commercial relations 
and economic aid to encourage a rising neighbour to be benign’.13 As part 
of this accommodation, Japan also accepted China’s view on the status of 
Taiwan and agreed to include the ‘anti-hegemony’ clause (directed at the 
Soviet Union) in the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978.
This is not to suggest, however, that bilateral relations during the period 
after 1978 were entirely smooth. A dispute over history textbooks in 
the 1980s led to tensions in Japan’s relations not only with China but 
also with South Korea.14 Still, as Tsuneo Watanabe points out, Japan’s 
engagement with China during this period was driven by a number of 
positive developments. These included China’s opening up under Deng 
Xiaoping; the positive nature of Sino-US relations; the complementarity 
of the growing economies of Japan, China and the United States; and, 
finally, the optimistic outlook of Japan’s political leaders, who sought 
to deepen economic cooperation through the region, including with 
China.15 Overall, Japan’s approach to China during this latter part of the 
Cold War kept within the framework of the US‒Japan alliance but was 
also based around accommodation and avoiding confrontation.
12  Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis, London: Routledge, 2005, 
pp. 78–79.
13  Mike M Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy Toward the Rise of China’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 30, nos 4–5, 2007, p. 747.
14  Claudia Schneider, ‘The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective’, 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 617, no. 1, 2008, pp. 109–10. 
doi.org/10.1177/0002716208314359.
15  Tsuneo Watanabe, ‘Japan’s Security Strategy toward the Rise of China: From a Friendship 
Paradigm to a Mix of Engagement and Hedging’, Tokyo Foundation, 6 Apr. 2015, viewed Aug. 
2016, www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-strategy-toward-rise-of-china.
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Post–Cold War, 1989–2009
The end of the Cold War created tensions in both Japan’s alliance policies 
and its dealings with China. The drawbacks of the Yoshida Doctrine were 
already being exposed toward the end of the Cold War, and it was soon 
apparent that the doctrine was not well suited to the emerging post–
Cold War order. The Yoshida Doctrine did not offer much direction on 
how Japan might pursue a more active international role as an advanced 
economy. At the same time, Americans continued to allege free riding on 
Japan’s part, especially in relation to the 1991 Gulf War, where Japan was 
disparaged as only delivering ‘checkbook diplomacy’.16
These failings set off a new political debate in Japan about how the 
country should approach international politics and the US alliance in the 
post–Cold War era. This new ‘normalisation’ debate focused on the idea 
of becoming a ‘normal nation’ (futsū no kuni), within both the context 
of the US alliance and wider international relations. It was premised on 
the idea that Japan’s policies during the Cold War, and certainly during 
the Gulf War, had been abnormal and needed to be changed. Ichirō 
Ozawa, then in the LDP, argued that Japan had to take on more of the 
responsibilities of a normal nation and do more to cooperate with others 
in the international community. Ozawa argued for a strongly globalist 
vision that loosened the restrictions on Japan’s ability to do more on 
security matters (e.g. peacekeeping), but he also believed that in doing 
this Japan should be closely tied to international institutions such as the 
United Nations rather than just the US alliance.17 
This vision, however, was challenged by international developments in 
the 1990s and the early 2000s. It failed to provide convincing solutions 
to emerging instability and security threats in the Asia-Pacific, such as 
the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94. Instead, this threat, and 
the subsequent Taiwan Strait crisis, prompted the Japanese Government 
to work with Washington to restructure the alliance to better deal with 
the post–Cold War era. As Matake Kamiya explains, the alliance was 
16  Michael J Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 17.
17  Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Louisa Robinfien (trans.), 
Eric Gower (ed.), Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994, pp. 94–95. See also HDP Envall, Japanese 
Diplomacy: The Role of Leadership, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015, pp. 77–78.
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transformed from one intended to ‘counter a manifest, specific security 
threat’, such as that provided by the Soviet Union, to one able to address 
‘latent, unspecified sources of instability’.18 
It was also undermined by major events elsewhere in the world. 
In particular, the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 
exposed Japan’s lack of influence in global institutions, and especially the 
United Nations and, therefore, the assumptions about the utility of these 
institutions that underpinned the globalists’ arguments.19 Traditional 
security concerns, such as national defence and the alliance, then returned 
to the centre of the political agenda following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
the United States in 2001. The Japanese security debates quickly shifted 
toward alliance cooperation and America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In place of Ozawa’s vision, conservative Japanese politicians, led by 
Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi between 2001 and 2006, began 
implementing a revisionist idea of Japan as a normal nation. This new 
vision was much more clearly focused on Japan’s role in the alliance. 
In what Richard Samuels describes as ‘de facto collective self-defense’, 
Koizumi was able to push Japan toward supporting US activities by passing 
an anti-terrorism special measures law and dispatching Japanese ships 
(Aegis destroyers) to the Indian Ocean to support US forces operating 
in Afghanistan. The Koizumi administration later passed the Iraq Special 
Measures Law and dispatched Self-Defense Forces to Iraq to undertake 
humanitarian missions.20 These actions were part of a wider revision of 
Japan’s security role, with the focus not only on increasing capabilities but 
also on reforming institutions and changing norms.21
Whereas the end of the Cold War brought about considerable change 
to Japan’s alliance policies, the country’s approach to China was initially 
characterised more by continuity, even after the Tiananmen Square 
18  Matake Kamiya, ‘Reforming the U.S.–Japan Alliance: What Should Be Done?’, in G John 
Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi (eds), Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.–Japan Security Partnership in an 
Era of Change, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 93.
19  Satu Limaye, ‘Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 22, no. 2, 2000, pp. 332–35. doi.org/10.1355/CS22-2E. See also 
HDP Envall, ‘Japan’s India Engagement: From Different Worlds to Strategic Partners’, in Ian Hall 
(ed.), The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2014, pp. 44–46.
20  Samuels, Securing Japan, 2007, pp. 94–99. See also Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: 
Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 
2007, pp. 86–98, 113–32.
21  HDP Envall, ‘Transforming Security Politics: Koizumi Jun’ichiro and the Gaullist Tradition 
in Japan’, Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, art. 3, 2008.
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massacre of 1989. Although it imposed sanctions on China in response, 
the Japanese Government also moved more quickly to a policy of Chinese 
reintegration. Japan restored its yen loans program to China in 1990 and 
Emperor Akihito made an historic visit to that country in late 1992.22 
An important outcome of the Tiananmen Square massacre, however, 
was its effect on popular, as opposed to elite, perceptions of China in 
Japan. Positive impressions of China amongst the Japanese public fell 
substantially in this period, from nearly 70 per cent in 1988 to just over 
50 per cent following Tiananmen.23
Yet, as the 1990s progressed, Japan’s approach to China began to change. 
Japan remained broadly supportive of China’s integration into the 
regional economy, such as by backing its bid to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1999.24 Political relations, however, deteriorated 
throughout the decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which Japan 
saw as a major threat through the 1980s, altered the region’s basic order. 
Meanwhile, China’s more assertive conduct across Asia, and especially 
toward Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, began to affect 
Japanese perceptions of China. Beijing also became more economically 
and diplomatically active in East Asia, notably by contesting Japanese 
influence in the region’s multilateral institutions, such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and by developing closer bilateral 
trading relationships around the region.25 For Japan, the 1993–94 North 
Korean nuclear crisis created a new sense of insecurity, while China’s nuclear 
tests of 1995 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 heightened uncertainty 
regarding China’s strategic ambitions. In 1998, Japan was shocked first 
by a North Korean missile test in August and then by Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin’s strong criticism of Japan’s wartime conduct during a state 
visit in November.26 
Japan’s relations with China worsened through the 2000s, even as 
economic ties remained strong.27 That Japan was becoming less tolerant 
of Chinese criticism regarding its wartime conduct is well illustrated 
22  Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China’, 2007, p. 749.
23  Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China’, 2007, p. 749.
24  Björn Jerdén & Linus Hagström, ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator 
in the Rise of China, 1978–2011’, Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, p. 232.
25  Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China’, 2007, pp. 756–57. 
26  Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to 
Bandwagoning?, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 17. 
27  Jerdén & Hagström, ‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy’, 2011, p. 232.
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by Koizumi repeatedly visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine 
(where Japan’s war dead, including Class A war criminals, are enshrined). 
Japan also began to pursue a strategy that involved greater balancing vis-
à-vis China, especially by seeking out closer relations with other nations 
in the region, such as Australia and India.28 Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni, 
in turn, created hostility in Beijing (and also in Seoul) toward Japan, with 
popular anti-Japanese unrest becoming more prevalent throughout China. 
Tensions also increased as a result of the two sides’ ambitions over resource 
exploration in the East China Sea.29 Meanwhile, China continued to be 
more assertive in the region and especially toward Japan. Beijing increased 
its naval incursions into Japanese territorial waters, such as in 2004, 
when a Han-class Chinese nuclear submarine passed submerged through 
Japanese waters.30 
After Koizumi stepped down in September 2006, the two countries 
enjoyed a brief period of improving relations—a so-called ‘warm spring’.31 
The LDP, under leaders such as Shinzō Abe, sought to improve relations 
with China, including over history issues as well as earlier resource 
disputes.32 When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in 
September 2009, it promised a further improvement in bilateral relations. 
It was especially keen to strengthen Japan’s relations in Asia through 
a proposal for an East Asian Community (EAC). Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama and Ozawa both favoured a closer relationship with China, 
although the Chinese did not support the EAC concept. Nevertheless, 
28  Derek McDougall, ‘Responses to “Rising China” in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with 
Accommodation’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 21, no. 73, 2012, pp. 8–9.
29  On some of the problems over developing resources in the area, see James Manicom, 
Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014, pp. 145–47. Regarding the anti-Japanese protests, see 
‘Thousands Join Anti-Japan Protest’, BBC News, 16 Apr. 2005, viewed Aug. 2016, news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/asia-pacific/4450975.stm.
30  Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 2014, p. 130.
31  Linus Hagström & Björn Jerdén, ‘Understanding Fluctuations in Sino–Japanese Relations: 
To Politicize or to De-politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 83, no. 4, 
2010, p. 721. doi.org/10.5509/2010834719.
32  Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 2014, pp. 122–65. On Abe’s approach to China, see HDP 
Envall, ‘Abe’s Fall: Leadership and Expectations in Japanese Politics’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 19, no. 2, 2011, p. 155. doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.600164.
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Ozawa took a delegation of DPJ politicians and officials to Beijing in late 
2009 to discuss closer relations and to establish better links between the 
Chinese Communist Party and the DPJ.33 
The Newly Contested Order, 2009–16
When the revisionism of Koizumi and Abe lost momentum in the late 
2000s, the globalism of the 1990s made a comeback in the form of a 
new ‘Asianism’. This was adopted by the DPJ in 2009 and represented 
a major challenge to the hard-power worldview and US-centrality that 
revisionists had been attempting to consolidate. With this more Asian-
centric approach, the DPJ sought to return Japan to an institutionally 
focused, comprehensive-security agenda concentrated on integrating 
Japan more into the region. It also aimed to revise the US‒Japan alliance 
so that Japan would have greater autonomy from the United States—
viewed in the wake of the global financial crisis as in decline—and so 
that the relationship would become more ‘equal’. In particular, the DPJ 
sought to reduce what it saw as an ‘alliance burden’ on the Japanese public, 
especially that caused by the presence of US military bases in the country, 
such as those in the prefecture of Okinawa.34 
The DPJ’s agenda, however, collapsed under the weight of poor leadership, 
lack of government experience, and an increasingly contested new regional 
order. In terms of intra-alliance politics, the DPJ struggled to build 
a functioning relationship with the new US administration under Barack 
Obama. Hatoyama, in particular, lost the confidence of the United States 
as he switched between different policies and approaches to the alliance, 
especially over the Okinawan base issue.35 The unravelling of the DPJ’s 
alliance policies under Hatoyama caused the DPJ, initially under Naoto 
33  HDP Envall & Kiichi Fujiwara, ‘Japan’s Misfiring Security Hedge: Discovering the Limits 
of Middle Power Internationalism and “Strategic Convergence”’, in William T Tow & Rikki 
Kersten (eds), Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 62–64.
34  Regarding the DPJ’s Asianism, see Daniel Sneider, ‘The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign 
Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan’, Asia Policy, no. 12, 2011, pp. 99–129. See also Envall, 
‘Clashing Expectations’, 2015, pp. 72–73. On the DPJ’s Okinawa policy, see HDP Envall & Kerri Ng, 
‘The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics’, Asian Security, vol. 11, no. 3, 2015, pp. 231–33. 
doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2015.1111339.
35  Tomohito Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013, pp. 168–79; Masahiro Matsumura, ‘Okinawa and the 
Politics of the Alliance’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 4, 2011, pp. 157–59. doi.org/10.1080/00396338.201
1.603567.
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Kan and then under Yoshihiko Noda, to focus more on the alliance. 
In  late 2010, the government set out its plan to establish a Dynamic 
Defense Force emphasising greater mobility, versatility and flexibility in 
the Self-Defense Forces. The plan focused on increasing Japan’s capacity 
to respond effectively to ‘grey-zone’ conflicts (i.e. disputes that did not 
automatically constitute war). The DPJ also began engaging in a limited 
way with the US-backed proposal for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.36 
These changes did not constitute a transformational agenda in the vein 
of  Koizumi and Abe, but represented an incremental reorientation of 
Japan’s alliance policies. The DPJ refrained from more controversial steps, 
such as the formal adoption of the right to collective self-defence. Only 
when the LDP was returned to government in 2012—led once again 
by Abe—did Japan return to the revisionist agenda. The second Abe 
administration has subsequently replaced the dynamic defence force idea 
with the concept of making a ‘proactive contribution to peace’. Although 
euphemistic and vague, this concept is intended to achieve concrete and 
transformational aims. In its 2013 National Security Strategy, the Abe 
government envisaged the concept as helping to achieve key national 
objectives of strengthening the country’s deterrence capacity, deepening 
its alliance with the US, and broadening its regional diplomacy.37 
The accompanying policy changes have encompassed constitutional, 
institutional and capability adjustments. A National Security Council 
has been established, the government has ‘reinterpreted’ the constitution 
to allow collective self-defence, defence spending has been increased, 
and a new set of guidelines for US‒Japan security cooperation have 
been adopted.38 
The Abe administration’s strategy, therefore, has been focused on 
reinforcing the alliance with the United States to ensure that it remains 
at the centre of Japanese security policy. Japan has been consistently 
concerned about America’s commitment to Japanese security, pushing, for 
instance, for an explicit understanding that the disputed Senkaku Islands 
36  Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics, 2013, pp. 197–201. See also Envall & Ng, ‘The Okinawa 
“Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics’, 2015, p. 229.
37  Government of Japan, ‘National Security Strategy’, 17 Dec. 2013, p. 5.
38  Christopher W Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism 
or New Dead End?, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 28–69; Jeffrey W Hornung & Mike 
M Mochizuki, ‘Japan: Still An Exceptional U.S. Ally’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 1, 2016, 
pp. 97–100. On the US‒Japan guidelines, see also Tomohiko Satake, ‘The New Guidelines for 
Japan‒U.S. Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role’, Asian Politics and Policy, 
vol. 8, no. 1, 2016, pp. 27–38. doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12239.
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come under the US‒Japan security treaty.39 Such concerns have also 
caused Japan to hedge against US abandonment by attempting to forge 
better relations elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. It is important, therefore, 
not to overlook the third of the above objectives: Tokyo’s ambition 
to strengthen the regional dimension of Japanese diplomacy. 
Where the DPJ’s approach to Asian regionalism was multilateral, the 
LDP under Abe has developed a minilateral approach.40 That is, Tokyo 
is now attempting to become a more active participant in ‘intra-spoke’ 
cooperation with US allies and partners in the region, most notably 
Australia but also India. This follows on from the approach adopted by 
Koizumi and Abe to relations with the United States, Australia and India 
in the early and mid-2000s. Japan is also now seeking to engage more 
with the nations of South-East Asia, especially the Philippines. In 2012, 
Abe argued that the United States, Japan, Australia and India should seek 
to establish a security ‘diamond’ stretching across the Pacific and Indian 
oceans to ‘safeguard the maritime commons’ in the region.41 Thus far, 
these types of partnership remain relatively low-key. They are also subject 
to uncertainty about their trajectory, as illustrated by the recent anxieties 
in the Japan‒Australia strategic partnership over a proposed (but failed) 
submarine deal.42 Nevertheless, Japan’s increased activity in this area 
points toward Japan adopting a hybrid approach to security combining 
alliance reassurance with new forms of regional engagement.43
Revival of the Abe agenda did not stem only from the DPJ’s poor 
alliance  management. China’s rise has stimulated the emergence of 
a new, more contested regional order that has played an important role 
39  Mizuho Aoki, ‘Obama Assures Abe on Senkakus’, Japan Times, 24 Apr. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/24/national/obama-tells-abe-security-treaty-covers-senkakus/.
40  HDP Envall, ‘Japan’s “Pivot” Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance’, 
Security Challenges, vol. 12, no. 3, 2016, pp. 17–18.
41  Shinzo Abe, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, Project Syndicate, 27 Dec. 2012, viewed Aug. 
2016, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.
42  On the Australia‒Japan strategic partnership, see Thomas S Wilkins, ‘From Strategic Partnership 
to Strategic Alliance? Australia‒Japan Security Ties and the Asia-Pacific’, Asian Policy, no. 20, 2015, 
pp. 81–111. Also HDP Envall & Ian Hall, ‘Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional 
Security Governance’, Asian Politics & Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2016, pp. 93–95. doi.org/10.1111/
aspp.12241. Regarding the failed Australia‒Japan submarine deal specifically, see Nick Bisley & 
HDP Envall, ‘The Morning After: Australia, Japan, and the Submarine Deal that Wasn’t’, Asia Pacific 
Bulletin, East‒West Center, no. 346, 7 Jun. 2016, viewed Aug. 2016, www.eastwestcenter.org/
publications/the-morning-after-australia-japan-and-the-submarine-deal-wasn%E2%80%99t.
43  On minilateral engagement, see William T Tow & HDP Envall, ‘The U.S. and Implementing 
Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: Can Convergent Security Work?’, IFANS Review, vol. 19, 
no. 1, 2011, pp. 59–60. 
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in sabotaging the idea of Japan acting ‘as a bridge between China and 
the US’.44 The ‘warm spring’ of Sino–Japanese relations that began under 
Abe, and which Hatoyama had so actively pursued, came to an end in 
2010. In  March that year, North Korea sank a South Korean corvette 
(the Cheonan); in September a Chinese fishing vessel rammed a Japanese 
Coast Guard ship near the disputed Senkaku Islands and set off a major 
diplomatic incident; and, in November, North Korea bombarded the 
South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. The incident near the Senkaku 
Islands was particularly damaging to Sino–Japanese relations. China 
responded to what Japan had initially viewed as a ‘policing’ issue by 
demanding compensation and an apology, delaying under mysterious 
circumstances the export of rare earths to Japan, arresting a number of 
Japanese in China and increasing its military activity in the East China 
Sea. This reaction comprehensively undermined the DPJ’s Asianist 
strategy, thereby contributing significantly to the party’s return, described 
earlier, to a more orthodox, alliance-based approach.45 
In fact, the 2010 incident not only brought about a dip in Sino–Japanese 
relations, but also led to a more long-term deterioration in mutual 
threat perceptions. It should be noted that the Japanese Government 
itself exacerbated matters when, in 2012, Tokyo Governor Shintarō 
Ishihara, a controversial nationalist, attempted to purchase islands in the 
Senkaku chain. The DPJ then decided to nationalise all the islands in 
order to prevent Ishihara from further damaging Sino–Japanese relations. 
Regardless, China reacted furiously. Violent protests broke out, normal 
diplomacy was disrupted, and China increased the rate of its naval 
incursions into the disputed area. Japan, in turn, dispatched coast guard 
vessels, creating a situation whereby a maritime confrontation between 
the two nations, although unlikely, was now conceivable.46 Subsequent 
incidents, including two in January 2013 where Chinese frigates locked 
their fire-control radar onto Japanese destroyers in the area, further 
heightened mutual threat perceptions.47 By 2014, the mutual disregard 
44  Takashi Yokota, ‘The Real Yukio Hatoyama; Japan’s New Prime Minister Could Be Asia’s First 
“Third Way” Leader’, Newsweek, 28 Sep. 2009. On the relationship between Hatoyama and Obama, 
see Tsuyoshi Sunohara, ‘The Anatomy of Japan’s Shifting Security Orientation’, Washington Quarterly, 
vol. 33, no. 4, 2010, pp. 39–57, 51–52.
45  Envall & Fujiwara, ‘Japan’s Misfiring Security Hedge’, pp. 68–71.
46  Thomas U Berger, ‘Stormy Seas: Japan‒China Clash over Senkakus Hard to Avoid’, Oriental 
Economist, vol. 81, no. 1, 2013, pp. 14–16.
47  Itsunori Onodera, ‘Extra Press Conference by the Defense Minister’, 5 Feb. 2013, viewed Aug. 
2016, www.mod.go.jp/e/press/conference/2013/02/05a.html.
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had grown to such an extent that Chinese and Japanese diplomats in the 
United Kingdom were describing each other as the Voldemort (chief villain 
of the Harry Potter books and films) of the Asia-Pacific. This pattern of 
antagonism, which has continued into 2017—albeit at a lower intensity 
and with some promising signs of improved communication—has not 
thus far done major harm to bilateral trade, but is now well established at 
the heart of the security relationship.48 
Conclusion: Japan’s New Alliance Approach
Japan remains America’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, as 
this chapter demonstrates, Tokyo’s view of the alliance, and its role within 
it, has changed significantly. Perhaps the central shift has been the way 
in which Japan balances the risks contained in the alliance framework 
and those presented by the reconfiguration of the regional security 
environment. This means that the interplay between how Japan sees 
China’s rise and how it seeks its ‘secondary alliance dilemma’ (the risks 
of the US‒Japan alliance) is reshaping Japan’s sense of the part it should 
play within the alliance.
In terms of regional reconfiguration, although East Asia presents a number 
of security threats to Japan, such as the North Korean nuclear issue, 
China’s rise is the dominant challenge. This is because China represents 
both a specific territorial threat and a broader systemic challenge for 
regional influence. Since the Cold War, as this chapter has outlined, 
China has increasingly contested Japan on territorial and systemic fronts. 
Japan’s perception of China as both a strategic rival and a direct security 
threat, therefore, has steadily risen, with Japan now viewing China not 
through the prism of the post–Cold War order but as the key dynamic 
in an entirely new, contested order where the regional balance of power 
is subject to a fresh struggle.
48  On the UK exchange, see Liu Xiaoming, ‘Liu Xiaoming: China and Britain Won the War 
Together’, Telegraph, 1 Jan. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/10546442/Liu-
Xiaoming-China-and-Britain-won-the-war-together.html; Keiichi Hayashi, ‘China Risks Becoming 
Asia’s Voldemort’, Telegraph, 5 Jan. 2014, viewed Aug. 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
asia/japan/10552351/China-risks-becoming-Asias-Voldemort.html. For an example of the mutual 
antagonism from mid-2016, see ‘Japan Warned China as Naval Vessel Neared Senkakus, Sources Say’, 
Japan Times, 19 Jun. 2016, viewed Aug. 2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/19/national/
japan-warned-china-as-naval-vessel-neared-senkakus-sources-say/.
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In the post–Cold War era, Japan adopted a mixed strategy of engagement 
and soft balancing in an attempt to restrain China’s rapid rise while also 
seeking to integrate China into the established order. As this new, more 
contested order has emerged, Japan has modified its mixed strategy into 
one focused more on hard balancing.49 Since 2010, Tokyo’s policy has 
been to increase the country’s hard-power capabilities, strengthening 
its regional diplomacy, and integrating the country more into 
the US alliance. Tokyo’s experiments with Asian regionalism under the 
DPJ may, therefore,  constitute Japan’s last attempt to pursue a strategy 
based primarily on integrating China into the Asian regional security 
system. That the DPJ’s ambitions were severely damaged by the various 
incidents in bilateral relations that occurred from 2010 has meant that 
revisionists, and not globalists, have come to dominate Japan’s strategic 
decision-making. 
The revisionists’ success has, in turn, reshaped how Japan views its alliance 
dilemma. Although its perception of alliance risk fluctuated during the 
Cold War, Japan was chiefly concerned with the dangers of entrapment. 
In fact, this persisted long after the end of the Cold War. In a new, more 
contested order, however, abandonment can be expected to become the 
greater risk. China’s rapid rise not only makes it a systemic rival for Japan 
but also makes balancing Chinese power more challenging. Significantly, 
this applies not only to Japan but also to the United States, since the 
superpower now also faces higher potential costs in seeking to balance 
China. Consequently, Japan’s dependence on the United States is 
increased even as its confidence in the US security guarantee declines. 
The key question for Tokyo now is whether the US security guarantee, 
which has been at the heart of the alliance, remains reliable.
By becoming a more active ally, Japan is attempting both to buttress the 
US position in Asia and to deter China. But the approach has potential 
risks as well as benefits. On the one hand, Tokyo will likely have less 
bargaining power in future in terms of resisting pressure from Washington 
to ‘do more’ in conflict situations. Accordingly, when making the changes 
to collective self-defence, the Japanese Government included a number of 
important restrictions on this new right, not only for domestic political 
purposes but to retain some capacity to resist outside pressure on Japanese 
49  Soft balancing here refers to balancing focused on politics or diplomacy, as opposed to hard 
balancing, which emphasises a military response. See Derek McDougall, ‘Responses to “Rising 
China”’, 2012, p. 3.
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decision-making. Whether this will prove effective, however, remains to 
be seen. On the other hand, a more active alliance role may serve a dual 
purpose for Japan in the coming years. Even as Tokyo’s policies are aimed 
at supporting the United States to stay engaged in the Asia-Pacific, they 
also create an insurance policy for Japan in case of a US withdrawal 
from the region. Within Japan’s new role as a more active ally, there is 
the beginning of a hedging strategy that seeks to increase the country’s 
independent deterrence capabilities.
This text is taken from Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 
21st Century, edited by Michael Wesley, published 2017 by ANU Press, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
